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The starting point for the search for exclamative sentence types in a lan-
guage is often the description of a certain function that utterances of sentences 
of that type would have. One formulation could be: With the use of an excla-
mative sentence, a speaker expresses that the state of affairs described by a 
proposition given in the sentence is not in accordance with his expectations 
about the world.1 Exclamative utterances may include an emotional attitude on 
the part of the speaker, which is often described as surprise in the literature, cf. 
Altmann (1987, 1993a), Michaelis/Lambrecht (1996), d’Avis (2001), Michaelis 
(2001), Roguska (2008) and others. Surprise is an attitude that is based on the 
belief that something unexpected is the case, see from a psychological point of 
view Reisenzein (2000).
The expression of disappointment of an expectation by the speaker can 
be related to the degree to which a certain property holds or to the proposition 
being the case, see (1a) and (1b).
(1) a. How fast he can play the solo!
 b. Dass der ein  Instrument spielt!
  ‚It’s surprising that he plays an instrument’
1  These considerations are partly based on a talk I gave on the annual conference of the 
German society for linguistics (DGfS) 3/2012 and on d’Avis (2001, 2013a). See also Rett 
(2011) for a similar deinition. I also thank the audience of the conference on « Exclamation 
and intersubjectivity », Nice 12/2015, Isabelle Ohles for help with the french abstract, and 
two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
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In (1a) the speaker expresses his amazement at the degree to which the 
individual he refers to can play the solo fast. In (1b) it is the fact that der/he 
plays an instrument which is surprising for the speaker.
The relevant property can be explicit as in (1a) or implicit as in (2).
(2)  What a house he has!
The amazing property of the house in (2) could be its dimension, its facili-
ties, or whatever. The property must be derived from the context.
If we interpret exclamatives as expressing that a certain state of affairs in 
the actual world is not in accordance with what the speaker expects we can say 
that it is not in accordance with what the speaker takes to be normal. In this 
relation, we can class exclamatives with certain other constructions that in one 
way or another employ the speaker’s ‚conception of normality‘ for semantic 
interpretation, for example concessive constructions or generic sentences.2 In 
these phenomena, we ind a relation to the speaker’s Normalcy Conceptions, 
expressed in a non-lexicalized, non-propositional way. With an exclamative, 
we understand that a speaker expresses that a certain proposition stands in 
contrast to his Normalcy Conceptions.
I will irst explain what I mean by ‚Normalcy Conception‘. Then, I will 
argue on the basis of dass-exclamatives that exclamatives stand in a certain 
relation to the speaker’s Normalcy Conceptions, in the case under discussion 
via the set of alternatives that is established by focus effects of the exclamative 
accent. Last I will show how the notion ‚that the speaker did not expect a certain 
proposition’ (in our case the proposition that stands for the sentence gramma-
tical meaning of the dass-exclamative) becomes part of the Common Ground.
2. NORMALCY CONCEPTIONS
Languages have different ways of explicitly expressing that a certain state 
of affairs conforms to what we consider normal. When Heinz brings his new 
girlfriend home for the irst time and they ind the cat, Henny, lying on the table, 
he could react to his girlfriend’s questioning look like (3).
(3)  Das ist normal.
  ‘This is normal.’
If we want to express that something is in accordance with our idea about 
what is normal, we can also choose expressions like (4).
(4) a. Das ist üblicherweise/herkömmlicherweise/gewöhnlicherweise so.
  ‘This is generally/customarily/commonly so’ 
 b. Das ist in der Regel/im Allgemeinen so.
  ‘This is so as a rule/in general’
2  Cf. d’Avis (2013a, 2016a, 2016c).
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 c. Das passiert regelmäßig.
  ‘This happens regularly’
 d. Das ist einfach so.
  ‘That’s simply the way it is’
The expressions in (3) and (4) have in common that a speaker explicitly 
says that he regards something as normal. There can be different reasons for 
why a speaker judges something to be normal. Considering (3), there can be 
different reasons why Heinz thinks that it is normal that his cat is lying on the 
table. Maybe, she is always lying there, or at least most of the time when he 
comes home. The occurrence of this state of affairs would have a high probabi-
lity because of the statistical distribution in the past.
(5)  Das ist normal. Da liegt sie fast immer.
  ‘This is normal. She is almost always lying there’
Or maybe Heinz is not very strict with Henny, allowing her to move freely 
in the apartment. The table is the perfect spot for her to get a good view on the 
mice coming out of the hole in the corner. Without this lookout, it would not 
be necessary for the cat to often lie on the table, however, nothing would speak 
against her being there either.
(6)  Das ist normal. Hier kann jeder machen, was er will, auch die Katze.
  ‘This is normal. Everyone can do as he likes, even the cat’
Or maybe, the table is the only warm and sunny place in the apartment.
(7)  Das ist normal. Katzen liegen gerne in der Sonne.
  ‘This is normal. Cats like lying in the sun’
Here, Heinz explains the normality of the situation by stating that his cat 
behaves like every other cat. She is a typical cat.
Whatever the reason for Heinz’ remark that the cat’s behaviour is normal, 
he obviously has an idea about what counts as normal, common, following cer-
tain rules, about what he can expect in a certain situation. That does not mean 
that Heinz’ utterance is true in a certain objective sense; this is not the point. 
The point is that Heinz utters (3) on the basis of certain conceptions about what 
he considers to be normal. Such conceptions I call ‘Normalcy Conceptions’ 
(NC).
Normalcy Conceptions are speaker-related and individual. What A inds 
normal does not have to be normal for B. It does not follow, however, that there 
is no class of NC that is identical or more or less similar for most people in a so-
ciety. If this was not the case, neither communication nor mutual action should 
be possible. I do not mean codes or rules that deine how the world should be, 
but ideas about how the world is. We know that we must not steal, but it is still 
normal for us to lock up our doors and bicycles. 
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An utterance like (3) is generally related to the speaker S: This is normal 
for S. There are other possibilities to instantiate the person variable and there 
are further parameters that can be made explicit.
Consider (8).
(8)  Das ist normal für Maria.
  ‘This is normal for Maria.’
(8) is ambiguous. An utterance of (8) can mean that Maria considers what-
ever this refers to as being normal, or, alternatively, that S considers it to be 
normal with respect to Maria.
Expressions like normal are relative, they can relate to an individual, (9a), 
a time, (9b), a place, (9c), a certain group, (9d), or certain conditions, (9e). 
Generally speaking, they relate to a certain frame of reference that can be made 
explicit.
(9) a. Das ist normal für Maria.
  ‘This is normal for Maria.’
 b. Das war damals normal.
  ‘This was normal at that time.’
 c. Das ist normal im Dschungel.
  ‘This is normal in the jungle.’
 d. Das ist normal bei den Indianern.
  ‘This is normal for Indians.’
 e. Das ist normal, wenn xy der Fall ist.
  ‘This is normal, if xy is the case.’
Without explicit instantiation of the parameters, these must be instantiated 
relative to the context, and we have to assume that the NC used are those of the 
speaker. NC belong to a certain individual and since we are interested in the 
role of NC in linguistic utterances, I concentrate on the assumption that every 
speaker maintains certain NC. We can for now describe the NC of a speaker S 
as (a subset of) the propositions that are true in the worlds that S considers to 
be normal.3
NC are related to basic conceptual knowledge. It is a human trait to support 
NC. People classify the phenomena in their surroundings and reach generaliza-
tions, often without reasonable statistical knowledge, sometimes only based on 
a single instance.  The one time experience: The neighbour’s Rottweiler almost 
bit me can be the basis for a NC: Rottweilers like to bite people. But NC do not 
have to be based on personal experience. Probably in most cases, our NC are 
based upon knowledge we acquire from other people: parents, siblings, friends, 
3  I have nothing to say about how S acquires his or her NC. This is partly a question for 
psychological research.
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teachers and of course from other sources like books or the internet.
Normalcy Conceptions (NC) have the following properties:
1. NC are speaker related, provided that no other possibility is explicitly 
given. Generally speaking, NC are relative, related to a certain frame of refer-
ence. In this sense they are local, which means NC are formulated for a certain 
part of reality that is restricted by the overall knowledge of the speaker and 
the capability of our sensory perception. Normally, we do not have a NC with 
respect to the behaviour of H2O-molecules in elevated temperature (except 
maybe physicists or chemists), but we sure have an idea about the effect of hot 
steam on our skin.
2. An NC is meaningful for a speaker, if to assume it is more beneitting 
than not to assume it. Whether a beneit is really at hand is not the crucial point, 
but the speaker’s conviction that there is one. This means also that it may be ir-
relevant for the speaker whether a certain NC is true in an objective sense or not.
3. NC allow exceptions. They are not universal propositions that are given 
up if a counter example shows up, but can be of relevance for a speaker, even 
if it is clear that they do not hold in all cases. If NC have this property, certain 
questions arise that I cannot go into, that probably belong to Psychology: How 
many exceptions does an NC allow? Are there NC that abide, even though there 
are no positive instances, i.e. only exceptions? If so, how do those NC come 
into being?4
If NC are formulated as propositions, we can regard them as the proposi-
tionalisation of (speaker-) normality. Normality should not be confused with 
normativity. Whereas normativity relates to given norms and to the way the 
world should be, normality describes a speaker’s/person’s notion of how the 
world is or rather how the world probably or generally is. It does not have to be 
a shared, superindividual notion. There can be agreement between the members 
of a group, but this is not constitutive for an NC. In the irst instance it is related 
to an individual.
We can deine Normalcy Conceptions like the Common Ground, as a set 
of propositions like (10):
(10)  NCS: {p | p is true in all possible worlds S considers to be normal}
A speaker’s S Normalcy Conceptions are represented by the set of all pro-
positions p for which holds: p is true in all possible worlds the speaker S consi-
ders to be normal.
4  NC can also affect our perception of the world, making supporting evidence more 
salient than contradictory one.
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Now to exclamatives and related alternatives. I will restrict myself to dass-
exclamatives, but the indings carry over to other types of exclamatives, see 
d’Avis (2013a).
3. ALTERNATIVES IN EXCLAMATIVES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE SPEAKER’S 
NORMALCY CONCEPTIONS
If a speaker utters an exclamative like (11)
(11)  S1: Dass Maria DEN geheiratet hat!
   that   Maria him   married    has
   ‚Surprising that Maria married him!‘
an addressee understands that there is a proposition p describing the actual 
world (that Maria married him, him referring to the person Maria had married), 
which is in the case of dass-exclamatives presupposed. Moreover the addressee 
knows that there is a proposition p‘ (or a set of propositions) that describes what 
the speaker had expected, what the speaker takes to be normal with respect to a 
proper husband for Maria.
What do we know about these propositions?
1.  The proposition p is the sentence grammatical meaning of the dass-ex-
clamative. Even if the referent of ‚den/him‘ is not made explicit in the utterance, 
we have to assume, that the speaker knows who he is. Otherwise the exclama-
tion is not felicitous.
So, if the addressee asks (12a), S1 cannot answer (12b).
(12) a. S2: Who did she marry?
 b. S1: I don’t know.
2. The speaker must have an idea about who he would rather think that 
Maria has married, or at least about properties of a suitable husband, see (13).
(13) a.  S2: Who do you think she should have married?
 b.  S1: Maybe Peter/maybe someone who is nicer.
The point is that there are alternatives available to the true proposition p. 
How do we compute these alternatives and in what relation do they stand with 
respect to the proposition of the exclamative?
That is the place where the focal effects of the exclamative accent in dass-
exclamatives come into play. The main accent of an exclamative is the so-called 
exclamative accent. In the examples, the position of the exclamative accent is 
indicated by upper case. Experiments show that it can easily be distinguished 
from contrast accents or other focussing accents. Its particular properties are 
greater maxima with respect to the basic frequency, greater length and possibly 
a higher intensity, where the intensity maximum in the main accent syllable lies 
earlier than the F0-maximum, cf. Oppenrieder (1988), Batliner (1988). Altmann 
(1993b) explores the interrelation between various sentence types and focus-
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background-structure. To make a long story short: With respect to the question 
if the exclamative accent has focus-properties, if it has any focus effects in 
terms of reference to a set of alternatives, his answer is basically negative.
Since I will concentrate on dass-exclamatives here, I just quote Altmann 
with respect to the example in (14).
(14)   Dass ich DAS (aber auch) erleben muss!
   ‘Surprising that I have to experience that!’
The exclamative accent on the demonstrative pronoun is according to Alt-
mann (1993:34) without focus effects: “[…] eine fokale Interpretation scheidet 
mit hoher Sicherheit aus [a focal interpretation can be excluded with high cer-
tainty (my translation, FD)].”
Nevertheless, I want to have another look at dass-exclamatives. For dass-
exclamatives, demonstrative pronouns are typical, which often bear the main 
accent, realised as an exclamative accent. If focus/focussing has to do with set-
ting up a relation to alternatives or indicates the presence of alternatives, relevant 
for the interpretation of an utterance (cf. Rooth 1985, 1992; Jacobs 1988; Krifka 
2007 and many others), than the following example shows, that different posi-
tions of the exclamative accent result in different sets of alternatives, see (15).
(15) a. S1: Der Karl hat dem Friedrich verraten, dass Heinz gelogen hat.
   ‚Karl revealed to Friedrich that Heinz lied’
 b. S2: Dass DER dem das verraten hat!
 c. S2: Dass der DEM das verraten hat!
 d. S2: Dass der dem DAS verraten hat!
   ‘It is amazing that he revealed it to him!’
The accent on the demonstratives can be realised as an exclamative accent. 
I think we can safely assume that, if we are dealing with focus here, it is a mini-
mal focus on the pronoun.
Intuitively, it seems to be obvious that (15b–c) express different things. 
However, if the function of focus is setting up a relation to sets of alternatives, 
why do we need these sets of alternatives in the case of exclamative utterances? 
Let us assume that the Common Ground is a set of propositions that are consi-
dered to be true by all interlocutors and all interlocutors know or at least assume 
that the others consider them also to be true. What happens to the Common 
Ground if a dass-exclamative like (15b) is uttered? Suppose we have two inter-
locutors, S1 and S2. The Common Ground is empty, except for certain world 
knowledge and knowledge about Karl, Friedrich and Heinz.
S1 asserts (15a). If the assertion succeeds, S2 accepts it, he does not di-
sagree or question it, the interlocutors agree that the actual world is a world 
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where the proposition ‘that Karl revealed to Friedrich that Heinz has lied’ is 
true. This proposition is added to the Common Ground, see (16).
(16)    CG0: | |
  S1: Der Karl hat dem Friedrich verraten, dass Heinz gelogen hat.
    CG1: | that Karl revealed to Friedrich that Heinz has lied |
  S2: Dass DER dem das verraten hat!
Now, S2 utters his exclamative sentence. S2: Dass DER dem das verraten 
hat! We understand that der refers to Karl, dem to Friedrich and das to the 
fact that Heinz had lied. The content, the proposition of S2’s utterance is: that 
Karl revealed to Friedrich that Heinz has lied. This is obviously the same 
proposition that is already in the Common Ground: S1 did assert it and S2 
had accepted it.
Or maybe, S2 didn’t really accept the proposition, and the utterance of the 
dass-exclamative questions the truth of the proposition? Does S2’s utterance 
have the same effect as (17)?
(17)   Ist das wirklich wahr?
   ’Is this really true?’
This does not seem to be the case, the effect of the exclamative utterance is 
different. Neither is the proposition asserted by S2’s exclamative utterance. At 
least not, if we understand assertion like Stalnaker (1978), because it is already 
part of the Common Ground.
However, there are cases where one could think that a proposition that is 
already in the Common Ground is asserted (again). Consider (18) as a response 
to S1’s assertion in (15a).
(18)  S2: Karl hat dem das verraten.
   ’Karl revealed it to him.’
S2 uses a V2-declarative sentence, which is typically used for assertions. 
However, (18) need not be an assertion. It could be a kind of echo-question. In 
this case, we would probably recognise it by its special rising intonation and 
S1 would have to answer in an afirmative way. S2 could also just repeat the 
sentence that S1 had asserted, an acknowledgement of some sort or just to make 
the content clear for himself. Even in such a case, we would expect a certain 
kind of intonation. 
If S2 in uttering (18) does not make it clear in one way or another that he is 
not asserting the proposition, he runs the risk of catching blame like (19).
(19)  S1: Das habe ich doch gerade gesagt. Hörst du mir nie zu?
   ’I just said this. Don’t you ever listen?’
Such a response would certainly be inappropriate after an exclamative utter-
ance of the dass-sentence, see (20).
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(20)  S1: Karl hat Friedrich verraten, dass Heinz gelogen hat.
  S2: Dass DER dem das verraten hat!
  S1: #Das habe ich doch gerade gesagt. Hörst du mir nie zu?
I think we can be fairly sure that in uttering the dass-sentence, S2 did not 
assert its proposition.
So, we have the following situation: S2 utters a sentence, the related pro-
position is already part of the Common Ground. In uttering the dass-exclama-
tive sentence, it is not S2’s goal that the proposition be added to the Common 
Ground. The speaker, in this case S2, expresses something that has to do with his 
attitude towards the relevant proposition. This is in principle what I described 
before, as the basic function of exclamatives: the speaker expresses that he, with 
respect to the relevant proposition, had expected something else. Expectation 
must not be understood here in the sense of S2 actively expecting something 
with respect to the proposition ‘that Karl revealed to Friedrich that Heinz has 
lied’. S2 wasn’t probably even aware that there was something Karl could have 
revealed to someone else. Why should he have a different expectation with re-
spect to this state of affairs? I understand expectation of a speaker rather like 
(21) referring to the deinition of Normalcy Conceptions I gave above.
(21)    The expectations of a speaker S are what follows from the speaker’s 
Normalcy Conceptions NCS.
Coming back to S2’s exclamative utterance, what S2 expresses with the 
sentence in (22) in the above context
(22)  S2: Dass DER dem das verraten hat!
is that the proposition ‘that Karl revealed to Friedrich that Heinz has lied’ 
is not compatible with his Normalcy Conceptions, that is, it may not follow 
from the set NCS2. By positioning the exclamative accent on the subject pro-
noun, something more is expressed, namely that there are alternatives to Karl, 
and if they take the place of Karl in the proposition this results in alternative 
propositions that are compatible with the set NCS2, maybe the ones in (23).
(23) {that Anton revealed to Friedrich that Heinz has lied,
 that Berta revealed to Friedrich that Heinz has lied,
 that Caesar revealed to Friedrich that Heinz has lied}
The accent on the pronoun indicates that there are alternatives, the illocu-
tion type exclamative indicates in what domain the alternatives are relevant. 
It is obvious that the alternatives are no longer live options with respect to the 
Common Ground. The Common Ground is already closed for this issue. For our 
chosen example with the exclamative accent on the subject pronoun, the speak-
er expresses that the proposition is false in the worlds he considers normal, 
whereas propositions with an alternative denotation for the expression in sub-
ject position are compatible with the set comprising his Normalcy Conceptions.
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That it makes sense to assume the existence of these alternatives and their 
relation to the speakers Normalcy Conceptions is shown by the fact, that this 
can be made explicit by the speaker, as we have seen in (13) above, also with 
respect to our recent example, cf. (24).
(24) a. S1: Der Karl hat dem Friedrich verraten, dass Heinz gelogen hat.
   ‚Karl revealed to Friedrich that Heinz lied’
 b. S2:  Dass DER dem das verraten hat! I habe gedacht, Anton würde es ihm 
verraten.
    ‘It is amazing that he revealed it to him! I thought Anton would reveal 
it to him.’
If we shift the exclamative accent to the other positions indicated above, 
the sets of alternatives change accordingly, see for the indirect object (25) and 
(26).
(25) a. S1: Karl hat dem Friedrich verraten, dass Heinz gelogen hat.
 b. S2: Dass der DEM das verraten hat!
(26)   {that Karl revealed to Dora that Heinz has lied,
   that Karl revealed to Emil that Heinz has lied,
   that Karl revealed to Gustav that Heinz has lied}
I think, an expression with an exclamative accent can have focus properties 
in the sense of Krifka (2007:19), cf. (27).
(27)   A property F of an expression α is a Focus property iff F signals
   (a) that alternatives of (parts of) the expression α or
   (b)  alternatives of the denotation of (parts of ) α are relevant for the 
interpretation of α.
About part b. of (27), I talked above. I want to add that focus effects for an 
exclamative accent are not conined to minimal focus. Focus projection seems 
also possible. Consider (28).
(28) a. S1: Heinz hat seinem Sohn zum Geburtstag eine Uhr geschenkt.
   ‘Heinz gave his son a watch for a birthday present
 b. S2:  Dass der seinem Sohn eine UHR schenkt!
   ‘Amazing that he gives his son a watch!’
If S2 expected (29a) the focussed part is ‚eine Uhr’. If S2 expected (30a) 
the focussed part is ‘eine Uhr schenkt’.
(29) a.   {that Heinz gives his son a book as a birthday present}
 b. S2: Dass der seinem Sohn [eine UHR]F schenkt!
(30) a.  {that Heinz goes to the baths with his son}
 b. S2: Dass der seinem Sohn [eine UHR schenkt]F!
Expression focus, as deined in (27a), is a bit harder. Krifka (2007) uses 
the example in (31).
(31)   Grandpa didn’t [kick the BUcket]F, he [passed aWAY]F.
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The point is that it is not the denotations of the alternative expressions that 
are different, it is in both cases the property DIE, but other aspects, here the 
connotations connected with the expressions. Maybe the following examples 
for exclamatives sufice.
(32) a. S1: Heinz war gestern total besoffen.
   ‘Heinz was totally pissed yesterday’
 b. S2:  Dass der sich [beSOFfen]F hat, ich dachte der würde sich nur [be-
TRINken]F.
   ‘Amazing that he was pissed, I thought he would only get drunk.’
(33) a. S1: Ich bin beim Präsidenten und seiner Frau eingeladen.
   ‘I’ve been invited by the president and his wife.’
 b. S2: Dass der eine [FRAU]F hat, ich dachte, der hätte eine [GeMAHlin]F.
   ‘Amazing that he has a wife, I thought he had a spouse.’
It seems that expression focus is also possible.
I have shown that exclamative accents can have focus effects. It is, howe-
ver, not obvious that they must have them. If we look at other exclamative sen-
tence types, for instance wh-exclamatives like (34), it seems hard to discover a 
focus effect. 
(34)   [The mother of Heinz gave him an expensive watch as a present]
 a. S: Was DIE dem geschenkt hat!
 b. S: Was die DEM geschenkt hat!
   ‘Amazing what she gave to him!’
The irst point is that the relevant alternatives for the exclamation are com-
puted via the wh-phrases. For (34a) and also for (34b) this means that the speak-
er expected that the referent of die/she, namely the mother of Heinz, gave Heinz 
something else for a present. I have the feeling that there is indeed a difference 
between (34a) and (34b), but it is not easy to see. Maybe, one would expect that 
(34a) is similar to (35).
(35)   [The mother of Heinz gave him an expensive watch as a present]
  S: Dass DIE dem DAS geschenkt hat!
   ‘Amazing that she gave this to him!’
Here, it seems easier to understand a complex focus with alternatives 
like (36).
(36)   Ich hätte eher gedacht, dass sein VATer ihm ein AUto schenkt.
    ‘I had rather expected that his father would give him a car as a present.’
It is possibly hard to align the computation of alternatives via question 
meaning to the computation of alternatives via focus in the course of language 
processing. Whatever the reasons, I think there is a difference between (34a) 
and (35).
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To sum up: The exclamative accent shows, at least with respect to dass-
exclamatives, focus effects. For different positions, different sets of alternatives 
come into play. And here, we ind the connection to normality, i.e. the speaker’s 
Normalcy Conceptions, in the interpretation of dass-exclamatives: The alterna-
tive propositions follow from the (set of) Normalcy Conceptions of the speaker. 
A restriction on this set is, that the basic proposition of the dass-exclamative 
may not follow from it. Even though the relation to the speaker’s Normalcy 
Conceptions is not expressed explicitly in exclamatives, it can be shown that 
reference to the set of Normalcy Conceptions is necessary for all different kinds 
of exclamatives, cf. d’Avis (2013a).5 This relation is not part of the sentence 
grammatical meaning6 of the sentence that forms the basis of an exclamative 
utterance, so how can it be integrated in the overall interpretation? In the next 
section, I will argue that reference to the speaker’s Normalcy Conceptions be-
comes part of the interpretation via the felicity conditions of exclamatives. To 
reach this conclusion, I will irst consider the interaction between exclamations 
and context.
4. EXCLAMATIONS AND CONTEXT CHANGE
I think that Normalcy Conceptions can exist relatively independently of the 
Common Ground. That means, people can hold certain views about what they 
think is normal, even if it follows from the Common Ground that these views 
are wrong. But from the fact that the alternatives to the true proposition in dass-
exclamatives stand in a certain relation to a speaker’s Normalcy Conceptions, 
these play an important role in the overall meaning of an exclamative utterance.
Consider the following example.
(37) a. S1: Maria hat Ludwig geheiratet.
   ‘Maria married Ludwig.’
 b. S2: Dass die DEN geheiratet hat!
   ‚Amazing that she married him!’
5  An anonymous reviewer wondered how discrepancy with the speaker’s Normalcy 
Conceptions can explain an example like (i) that could be felicitously uttered in a city where 
tall buildings are the norm, so that the speaker should have an idea about what to expect with 
respect to the height of buildings.
(i) My, what a tall building!
(ii) Boah, was für ein großes Gebäude!
There seem to be two possibilities. It could be that the speaker, being new in town, 
did not adapt his NC to the relevant norm, although in this case we would probably expect a 
plural noun phrase. On the other hand, it seems to me, at least for the German version in (ii), 
that the height of the building that is the reason for the utterance must be somehow remark-
able compared to the idea of height of tall buildings the speaker may have established in such 
a city.
6  For the sentence grammatical meaning of German wh-exclamatives see d’Avis (2001, 
2002).
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S2 does not consider it normal, it does not follow from his Normalcy 
Conceptions ‘that Maria married Ludwig’. He did rather expect alternatives 
for Ludwig, in any case did he not expect that Maria married Ludwig, see also 
Roguska (2008), who called this ‘exclamative inference’.
That S2 expected something else, or did not expect what came true, is 
information that is added to the Common Ground. This information is commu-
nicated so that S1 could – with respect to (37b) – reply (38a) or (38b).
(38) a. S1: Was ist denn daran komisch? Das war doch zu erwarten.
   ‚What is funny about that? Actually, it was to be expected.’
 b. S1: Hast du wirklich etwas anderes erwartet?
   ‚Did you really expect something else?’
The information that is added to the Common Ground is something like 
(39).
(39)  S2 did not expect that Maria married Ludwig.
How does this information ind its way into the Common Ground? I will 
have a short look at three different ways and then talk about another possibility.
(i) Is (39) an implicature? An implicature that is not challenged may end up 
in the Common Ground as shared knowledge. Consider the scalar implicature 
in (40).
(40) a. S1: Einige haben geschlafen.
   ‘Some were sleeping.’
   +> ‘not all were sleeping’
 b. S2: Wer war denn wach?
   ’Who was awake?’
S2’s question makes only sense if S1 and S2 accept the implicature as 
shared knowledge. An answer like (41), should S1 utter it, is not acceptable.
(41)  S1: #Niemand war wach.
   ‘Nobody was awake.’
An implicature can be cancelled, like in (42).
(42)  S1: Einige haben geschlafen, wenn nicht alle.
   ’Some were sleeping, if not all.’
If (39) was an implicature, it should be possible to cancel it, see (43).
(43)  S2:  Dass die DEN geheiratet hat! #Aber ich habe erwartet, dass sie ihn 
heiratet.
    ’Amazing that she married him. #However, I expected, that she would 
marry him.’
The continuation in (43) sounds strange, if not contradictory. (39) does not 
seem to be an implicature.
(ii) Is (39) a presupposition? Could (39) be a presupposition that must be 
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accommodated by the addressee? Normally, it is not acceptable to assert a pro-
position that was a presupposition of the preceding sentence, see (44).
(44)   Meine Katze ist krank. #Ich habe eine Katze.
   ’My cat is sick. #I have a cat.’
We do not ind this situation with (39), see (45).
(45)   Dass die DEN geheiratet hat! Das habe ich nicht erwartet.
   ’Amazing that she married him. I did not expect this.’
Quite the contrary, the continuation sounds perfectly natural, so (39) is 
probably not a presupposition.
(iii) Is (39) asserted after all? Asserted propositions can be stopped from 
entering the Common Ground. An interlocutor can negate it and so reject it, 
see (46).
(46) a. S1: Heinz ist ein Alkoholiker.
   ’Heinz is an alcoholic.’
 b. S2: Nein, das stimmt nicht./Nein, Heinz ist kein Alkoholiker.
   ’No, that is not true./No, Heinz isn’t an alcoholic.’
This is not possible for (39), see (47).
(47) a. S2: Dass die DEN geheiratet hat!
   ’Amazing that she married him!’
 b. S1: #Nein, du hast erwartet, dass Maria den Ludwig heiratet.
   #’No, you expected, that Maria would marry Ludwig.’
That (39) is asserted seems entirely impossible.
The addition of (39) to the Common Ground is neither carried out by impli-
cature, nor by presupposition nor by assertion.7 Nevertheless, it is clear that this 
information is part of the Common Ground. It is negotiable and an addressee 
can react to its presence, see (48) as a reply to S2’s (37b).
(48)  S1: Wie kommst du darauf, dass Maria jemand anderen heiraten würde?
   ’How could you think Maria would marry someone else?’
5. EXPECTATIONS AND FELICITY CONDITIONS
A possible solution to this problem, that was also seen by Roguska (2008), 
is that (39) is added to the Common Ground because it is part of the felicity 
conditions of an exclamation.
That parts of the felicity conditions of speech acts can ind their way into 
7  An anonymous reviewer suggested that the proposition that the speaker does not 
expect the existing state of affairs is added to the Common Ground as a conventional impli-
cature, cf. Castroviejo Miró (2008). While CIs share properties of the discussed inference, 
it is not really clear to me what lexical or constructional part is responsible for the CI in the 
sentences under discussion.
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the Common Ground can also be seen from other speech acts. I take it as evi-
dence that they are part of the Common Ground, if they are negotiable. Let’s 
have a look at the felicity conditions that Meibauer (2005) gives for assertion, 
see (49).
(49)   A asserted at t that p iff
  (a) A uttered at t the declarative sentence σ meaning p,
  (b) by uttering the declarative sentence σ, A presented p as true,
  (c) by uttering the declarative sentence σ, A M-intended that
   an addressee B to whom A uttered p actively believes that p.
(49c) means that the speaker A wants B to believe that p is the case. This 
ends up in the Common Ground and is directly negotiable. The addressee could 
reply to an assertion with utterances like (50).
(50)  a. Why should I believe this?
  b. Warum sollte ich dir das abnehmen?
  c. Und das soll ich dir abnehmen?
Or let’s take the speech act ‘promise’. A part of the felicity conditions of 
‘promise’ is often described as (51).
(51)    S believes that A would prefer him to do what is said in p rather than 
not do it.
This part of the felicity conditions can ind its way into the Common 
Ground. It is negotiable. Consider (52).
(52) a. S1: Ich verspreche dir, mit dem Saufen aufzuhören.
   ’I promise to stop drinking’
 b. S2:  Warum sollte ich das wollen?/ Du kannst von mir aus soviel saufen, 
wie du willst./Das ist mir doch egal, ob du säufst oder nicht.
    ‘Why should I want this?/ You can drink as much as you want./I don’t 
care whether you drink or not.’
So, parts of the felicity conditions of speech acts can be added as proposi-
tions to the Common Ground.
With respect to exclamations with a dass-sentence, we could assume the 
following conditions, see (53).
(53)   Exclamation (dass-exclamative)
    An utterance of a speaker S counts as an exclamation (dass-exclama-
tive) iff
  (i)  S utters a dass-exclamative sentences ε with the meaning (proposi-
tion) p;
  (ii)  p is already part of the Common Ground or can be accommodated 
without any dificulty;
  (iii)  ¬p follows from the Normalcy Conceptions of S (i.e. S did not expect 
that p).
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(39) can be added to the Common Ground as part of the felicity condition, 
see (53iii), as in comparable cases in other speech acts. I do not think this is 
too absurd. Provided that the exclamation succeeds, an interlocutor is forced to 
accept that (53iii) is the case. It is a fact, just as Stalnaker’s goat. The felicity 
conditions for dass-exclamatives can be generalized to all classes of exclama-
tives, s. d’Avis (2013a).
6. FACIT
I irst talked about Normalcy Conceptions and then had a look at the ques-
tion if the exclamative accent has focus properties and argued, at least for dass-
exclamatives, that the exclamative accent can signal the presence of alterna-
tives. I made a suggestion in what way they could be relevant for the interpreta-
tion and how they relate to Normalcy Conceptions and the Common Ground. I 
ended with some remarks about the relation between the Common Ground and 
possible felicity conditions for a speech act ‘Exclamation’.
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